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Regional government competition is an inevitable phenomenon during the development of 
Economic System in China, as well as a consequence of that regional government has become 
independent economic subject. Contemporary China’s regional government competition emerged 
after open-door policy, after which the market economy in China has developed greatly, and 
government’s system reform has advanced steadily, also the central governments regulated the 
power of inter-government so as to reinforce the autonomy of regional government. The regional 
government competition on one hand promotes allocation of resource; on the other hand it will lead 
to efficiency loss to some extent. According to the differences of externality, the expenditure of 
regional government can be divided into two separate parts, which is cooperation expenditure and 
competition expenditure.  
On this basis, this thesis establishes respectively a model of homogeneous and heterogeneous 
regional government competition, and then analyzes their effects on coordinated development of 
regional economy. The analyses present that, Firstly, homogeneous regional governments would 
make over-sized competition expenditure and insufficient cooperation expenditure, which leads to 
overall efficiency loss as well as un-coordinated development of regional economy, whereas the 
central government would regulate the regional government competition as well as coordinate the 
inter-government contract. Secondly, during the heterogeneous government competition, the 
regional government which is less efficient prefers to over–sized competition expenditure in order 
to gain more revenue than the higher-efficiency government, which also causes the distortion of 
allocation of efficiency. Therefore it is necessary for the central government to take some effective 
measures to regulate the regional government competition, such as to impose tax on the competition 
expenditure whereas to subside the cooperation expenditure, so as to cut down the competition cost 
as well as promote the inter-governmental cooperation, as a result of that, regional governments will 
establish new cooperative partnership with each other.          
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第一章、 绪论  
 
第一节、 政府竞争理论的理论综述 
     
    一、国外学者的论述 
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    对于政府合作的理论研究，早先主要由于经济发展的需要而进行研究的。赫克歇尔- 俄



























































    政府际管理理论与复合行政理论除各自产生的背景不同，相关内容有所差异，但是在
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